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If sugar prices are to be maintained at their
present levels, production controls will have to
be instituted, stocks will have to mount, or
subsidized exports will have to start.If the
political process is unwilling to accept any of
these three options, price supports will have to
be lowered.The Political Economy of Controls: American Sugar
Anne 0. Krueger*
In economic theory, it is relatively straightforward to analyze the impact
of politically-imposed controls over economic activity. Whether the control is
over feedgrain prices in Egypt, the quantities of imports of individual iteimns
in India, price controls over "old" oil, or the "voluntary" reduction in the
number of automobiles exported from Japan to the United States, several con-
clusions follow straightforwardly. First and foremost, those controls (and
most others) at best achieve their objectives in a a more costly manner than
would alternative mechanisms. Second, the presumed beneficiaries of controls
are often quite different from those (if any) actually benefitting. Third, the
costs of controls seem to be largely ignored or misunderstood in political
decision— making, at least in the first instance.
Despite these well-established results, controls seem to persist. A major
challenge confronting those concerned with these costs is therefore to attempt
to understand the reasons why the politial process often generates and per-
petuates high—cost solutions to stated objectives. To establish an understand-
ing of the political economy of controls would therefore appear to be a formi-
*1am heavily indebted to Paul Pecorino for valuable research assistance in
preparation of this paper. Al Reifman was extremely generous with assistance
in providing material from the Congressional Research Service. Richard Snape
was exceptionally helpful and generous in commenting on the entire manuscript
and in sharing his extensive knowledge of the international sugar economy.
Helpful comments and suggestions were made by members of the Political Economy
Workshop at Duke University, and the International Economics Workshops at Vir-
ginia Polytechnic and State University and the University of North Carolina.
1dable, but important, challenge, if means are to be sought to attain political
objectivesthrough least—cost means.
Ian Little has been in the forefront among professional economists using
their analytical toolkittodemonstrate the costs of controls in a variety
ofsettings. His work has been instrumental in convincing the vast majority of
theeconomics profession that the economic costs of controls are far greater
than was generally thought two or three decades ago. lt is therefore ap-
propriate that an essay in his honor attempt to further understanding of the
political economy of economic policy. To that end, this papersetsforth the
various hypotheses that are implicitly or explicitly madebyeconomists about
the determinants of controls and regulations. It then subjects those
hypotheses to scrutiny by examining how well they perform in explaining the
politicaleconomy of one particualar set of controls, those pertaining to
American sugar.
Tothat end, Section 1 contains a brief survey of the literature pertaining
to the political mechanisms generating controls. The next several sections
cover the essentials governing the production and distribution of sugar (Sect.
2),the origins of the Americtn sugar Program (Section 3), and its evolution
over the period from 1948 to 1987 (Sections 4 through 6). Section 7 then
provides a critical examination of the evolution of the program from the view-
point of the various hypotheses laid out in Section 1. A final section
provides some tentative conclusions.
Sect. 1. Models of Econonic Policy Formulation
Theabsence among economists' of a widely—acceptednodel of economic
1.There is a large literature among political scientists focussing on the
2policy formulation is readily illustrated by the divergent implicit and ex-
plicit assumptions about the nature of intervention underlying policy anaysis
in the various subfields in economics. In international trade, the tradition
was for long to assume that policy makers were uninformed and that failure to
adopt Pareto-optimal policies reflected ignorance on their part. International
economists assumed that a benevolent government would, once informed of the
benefits of free trade, immediately undertake policy reform. Considerable be-
wilderment then resulted from the many departures from Pareto—optimal policies
in circumstances where infant-industry and monopoly power in trade did not
apply.
Severalmodels ofpolitical-economicinteraction inpolicy formulation
havebeenset forth in an effort to understand the persistence of some
policies. Notable amongthemwere Brock and Magee (1978), who modelled
politiciansas needing money to win elections but simultaneously losingvotes
if they support lobbyists' causes too ardently: an equilibriumoccurs when the
revenue from lobbying at the margin increases votes by the sameamountas that
lobbying activity loses votes.Corden (1974), by contrast, attempted to ex-
plain internationaleconomic policy as a consequence of a 'conservative social
welfarefunction": politicians attempt to protect peoples' income streams, and
determinants of policy formulation. I am heavily indebted to Robert Bates for
long and useful discussions aboutthisliterature. In this section, I focus
only on the economics literature on the subject, in part because of my own
comparative advantage, but in part because the intent of the paper is to focus
on political—economic interactions, and the role of market forces in affecting
the outcomes of policies adopted by politicians, topics largely neglected in
both the economicsandthe political science literature.
3thus provide assistance to those who are adversely affected by shifts in
prices and competitive positions. Finally, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980)
modelled"directly unproductive activity",in which lobbyists spend resources
in seeking legislation equal in value to the value of the protection to them.
In public economics, there has been a similar tradition: a presentation of
economic efficiency conditions for optimality, with the accompanying assertion
that nonfulfillment of these conditions —suchas the presence of exter-
nalities -representeda case of marketfailure and thereforejustified market
intervention. Underlying these sets of policy prescriptions is the notion once
againof government as a benevolent guardian, hampered only by ignorance of
propereconomic policy as it seeks disinterestedly in maximizing Benthamite
socialwelfare.
In the field of industrial organization, by contrast, the tradition until
thel960swas to assume that government bureaucrats were in fact pursuing the
publicinterestin regulating whatever was regulated —transport,communica-
tions, public utilities, andthe like. This view was challenged, and largely
overthrownin the 1970s by Stigler, Peltzman, and others, who instead posited
full rationality of all actors. In this view, all political agents are ra-
tionaland use the political processto effect wealth transfers. Thus, the
viewof the regulatory process chnnged fundamentally, as it was seen as a ra-
tional outcome to private maximization through the political process. All par-
ticipants were seen to be fully rational and acting in their own self inter-
est. Inthis model, policy analysis by economists would serve no useful pur-
pose, as additional information would not change the behavior of anypar-
tic ipant in the regulatory process.
An interesting variant on the Stigler-Peltzman approach has been set forth
by Becker, who assumes that political interest groups fona in their own self
interest, and that politicians rationally choose policies in response to the
4competing pressures these groups can exert. With competition among groups, and
the assumption thatanything whichbenefits one groupmusteither be financed
directlyby a tax or indirectly by costing another group (including dead-
weight losses),Becker concludes that the resources are allocated to the
politicalprocess to maximize the benefits (which are for somegroupsnega-
tive) each group expects to receive.
Yet another approach is that of NancurOlson.Starting with the "logic of
collective action", in which the "free rider" problem prevents the effective
collusion of large groups of small losers, Olson formulated hypotheses as to
which groups would emerge and the characteristics of industries and of other
economic interest groups that would be likely to be effective. Carrying his
analysis further, Olson attempted to explain differentials in growth rates
among nations after the Second World War. In Olson's world, interest grups or-
ganize to protect their interests as growth progresses. Over time, more and
more groups and institutions are in place, and in the process economic ef-
ficienoy diminishes and growth decelerates. War destroys these groups and in-
terests, at least to some extent, so that war-devastated countries, such as
Germany and Japan are enabled to grow rapidly, freed of many of the resis-
tances to growth that arise over time in a war-free environment.2
Olson's modelessentially posits that economically—inefficient outcomes
arise because of free rider problems: it is rational for individuals not to
join groups interested in consumer welfare, etc., because the benefits to them
are independent of their ownactivites.This contrasts significantly with the
Stigler-Beckerview in two ways: institutional means are notavailable for
2.See Mueller for a series of papers examining the empirical validity of the
Olson hypotheses regarding growth rates.
5large groups of smallpootential gainers or losers to represent their inter-
ests, andinterestgroups form gradually over time as they learn about their
interests (and possibly respond to the gains of other groups).
Thefinal view of the political process is that of Buchananand the public
choicegroup. Here, the underlying assumption is that individuals behave in
their interest in the political ,aswell as the economic, arona, but that the
"rulesof the gone" in the political arena may permit choices that,while in-
dividually rational, could clearly be improved upon by a different decision
rule.As Buchananhasput it:
"Economistsshould cease proferring policy advice as if they were employed
bya benevolent despot, and they should look to the structure within which
politicaldecisions aremade (Buchanan,P. 223).
Eachof these modelshas testable hypothesesunderlying them. Do
politiciansanticipate the outcome of their controls? Arethey acting in their
ownself—interest, or the self—interest of the voters whom they represent in
anysense? Do lobbyists and other pressure groups always know and act in their
self—interest?
However, an important difficulty is that it is not obvious how one could
systematicallycollectdata thatwouldprovide for statistical estimates of,
e.g., the fraction of time that politicians wereinfluenced by lobbyists and
thefraction they represented their constituents or how one could measure the
pressures confronting politicians.
Thus, to date the variety of models of political—economic interaction have
not been subject to empirical testing. Yet empirical evidence with regard to
behavior is essential if progress is to be madeinbetter understanding of the
political economy of controls.
6In an effort to start providing empirical evidence, this paper is devoted
totrading the evolution of controls in one particular market -American
sugar -overtime.The essay covers controls over prices, production, and im-
portsof American sugar from 1934 to the present are analyzed herein, in the
hope that an empirical understanding of one set ofinteractions between
markets andpoliticans,andofthe evolution of one set of controls over time,
may besuggestive of some of the missinglinks in a fuller paradigm ofthe
politicaleconomy of controls, andpossibly of a methodology for empirically
assessinga number of controls to such scrutiny. In Sect.8, the competing as-
sumptions about behavior underlying the models set forth above are scrutinized
with respect to the experience with American sugar.
2. The Sugar Market
The eonomic effects of the American sugar program have been extensively
analyzed, and are reasonably well known. In this section, the essential
characteristics of the sugar industry, and the relation of the American market
to the international sugar market are described. Emphasis is on those aspects
relevant for analyzing the political economy of controls, at least as ex-
emplified in the case of sugar.
2.1. The Production Function3
Sugar is an unusual commodity. It can be made from either raw cane or
sugarbeets, and yet the end products of the two are perfect substitutes. Cane
can grow only in tropical or semi-tropical climates while sugarbeets are grown
in temperate climates. Both cane and beets require processing to make sugar.
3. This section draws heavily on Landell Mille (1985). The interested reader
can consult that source for considerably greater detail. The facts, however,
are in virtually all hearings pertaining to the sugar program.
7In both cases, initial processing must be undertaken within a very short time
after harvest; it must therefore be done close to where the cane or beet is
grown.
Forbeet sugar, a single stage refining process has Produced refined sugar
since thelate 1800s. In the case of cane, however, second stage refining is
nececssaryto make refined sugar; raw sugar (i.e., that processed from cane
near the site) can be refined anywhere.4 While there are a few byproducts of
cane and of beet, they are not sufficiently valuable to warrant growing the
crops in the absence of a demand for their sugar; at any event, the byproducts
made from cane and beet are similar.
Cane and beet mills, and cane refineries are capital intensive, and ap-
parently have little or no alternative use. No farmer would consider growing
cane or sugarbeet without a processing plant nearby, and no processor (of raw
cane and of sugarbeet —canerefining is different) would consider estab-
lishing aplant unless there were a proximate source of supply. For this
reason, there is a considerable degree of vertical integration in the in-
dustry; in Hawaii, for example, most cane is growninfields ownedbythe same
partieswho own thelocal sugar mill forfirst-stage refining.
Mills need afairly steady flow of cane/beet in order to utilize their
capacityreasonably steadily over a major part of the year. Arrangements for
harvesting sugarbeet and cane therefore include fairly detailed provisions as
tothe date of delivery of the product to the mill.
4. The United States hadatariff on raw sugar imports, and a higher tariff on
refinedsugar imports throughout most of the 19th century. At that time, beet
sugar required second-stage refining.The differential in tariffs between raw
and refined sugar was high enough to make the effective rate of protection to
refining greater than 100 percent. The best means of determining whether sugar
had been refined was the "Dutch color test" which graded imports by the extent
of brown colorationof the sugar being imported. Among the 19th century
problemswith tariff administration was the importation of brown refined
sugar.See Taussig 1924, Pp. 101 ff. for a full description.
82.2. The Demand for Sugar and Sweeteners.
More than 70 percent of U.S. sugar consumption is by industrial users -
bakeries,soft drinks, confectionary, cereals, etc.. The remaining 25-30 per-
cent of consumption goes through distribution directly to consumers (defined
as all sugar sold in bags of less than 50 pounds).
Consumption of refined sugar in the United States peaked at about 10.7
million pounds in 1972, equivalent to about 102 pounds per capita. At that
time,per capita consumption of all caloric sweeteners (corn sweeteners,
honey, etc.) was 13.3 million tons, or 25.1 pounds percapita.5By 1986,
American consumption of sugar had fallen to 7.44 million tons, or 61.1
pounds per capita, while total caloric sweetener consumption had risen to
15.898 million tons or 130.4 poundsper capita.6
2.3 The International Sugar Economy
5.This contrasts with an estimated consumption percapitaof 9 pounds in the
United States in 1822 (see Johnson, P.5). Here and throughout, the reader
should be alert to units: production is often measured in terms of tons of
caneorbeet;theseunits (contrast Tables 2and 3 below)are obviously dif-
ferent fromthose that measure the weight of refined sugar produced or con-
sumed.Since the yield of caneandbeet varies from year to year and place to
place, conversion ratios are not a constant. However, the conversion factor is
close to 10:1 —forexample in 1986, 28.743 tons of cane were produced, which
was 3.4 million tons of sugar, raw value. For beet, 25.229 tons were produced,
with 2.989 million tons of sugar, raw value produced. See USDA, Sugar and
Sweetener Situation and Outlook Yearbook, June 1981. For an amusing discussion
of the problems of administering an import quota set in terms of raw value,
see House Hearings 1974, Pp. 95-101.
6. Consumption of non-caloric sweeteners has also risen; in 1970 it is es-
timatedthat they accountedfor 5.8 pounds per capita cons.nnption,while by
1987they were 18.5 poundsper capita.There are manygrounds forbelieving
that much of the increase inconsumption ofnoncaloric sweeteners mayhave
represented a shift in tastes, rather than a consequence of relative price
changes. For thatreason,the evolution of noncaloric sweetener production and
consumptionwill not befurther considered in this paper. Taking itintoac-
count would not significantly alter the argument at any stage, as total con-
sumption of noncaloric sweeteners still occupies less than15percent of the
combined market.
9There are few countries in the world that do not intervene in their
domestic sugar markets. Perhaps this is because both temperate and tropical
countriescan grow sugar. Regardless of the motives for intervention, the
result is that about three quarters of sugar grown in the world is consumed in
the country of production.
For this reason, the international marketis sonewhat thin, with about
27million tons out ofanestimated total world production of about 100 mil-
liontons (sugar equivalent, both cane and beet) entering into international
trmde (Sugar and Sweeteners Situation, June 1987, P. 35) in the 1985\86 crop
year.Even out of that total, the existence of anumber of preferential ar-
rangements (including the American quota and Cuban-USSR trade) has meant that
the "free market" price has governed only a small fraction of transactions.
American preferences are diminishing in importance, however, as American im-
portshave fallen, for reasons that will become evident below, from 6.2 mil-
lion tons in 1977 to an estimated 1.5 million tons in l987.
The price of sugar has always displayed volatility on international
markets. Twofactorscontributed to this. First, there is an eighteen month
lagbetweenplanting of cane andfirst harvesting. Thereafter, cane is usually
cut two more times at approximately six month intervals before the field is
clearedand a new crop planted. Thus, when sugar prices rise, there is a
longer time-lag thanfor annual crops(although not as long as for sometree
crops)beforeadditional productionreaches the market. When thesugar price
falls, it is anevenlonger timebeforethe planting response is reflected in
reduced sugar output. Second, and at least as important,the fact thatthe in-
ternationalmarket is a residual has intensified these price swings.
7. In December 1987, the United States Department ofAgriculture announced
that the permitted levelof impocts for 1988 wouldbe 750thousandtons. See
NewYork Times,December 16 1987, P. 29.
10Thus, after Cuba lost her U.S. quota in 1960, world prices rose for several
years. Thereafter, new plantings (which took place predominantly in countries
which received higher sugar prices because of their increasedquotas inthe
Americanmarket)matured,and worldsugar supplies rose sharply; the world
price fell from a high of 8.5 cents per pound in 1963 to 1.86 cents perpound
in1966.That,in turn, apparently discouraged plantings, becauseby 1969 the
sugarprice was rising again. However, because of the worldwide commodity
boom, the production response was apparently more sluggish and delayedthan in
earlierperiodsof high prices. 1-fence, the price of sugar rose continuously
until November 1974, reachingover40 cents per pound in that month. There
thenfollowedanother sharp decline in price as new supplies appeared by 1976,
and the price fell for the next two years. By 1980, however, production had
once again responded tolower prices, andthe price again rose sharply, reach-
ing 29.02 cents per pound by the end of 1980.
Thereafter, the world price felland remained depressed for a long period
as American imports declined sharply and the European Community increased ex-
ports as its production surpluses mounted. It was estimated in 1985 that, if
all countries were to adopt free trade in sugar, the world price would be
about 12 cents per pound.9 That contrasted with an actual price at the end of
that year of about 4 cents per pound and a U.S. price of 20.3 cents per pound.
8. Cuba's exports and quota constituted the vast majority of sugar imports
intothe United States prior to 1960. In 1959, for example, Cubaexported
3,437,582 million tons to the United States out of total imports of 4,273,000
tons. This contrasted with domestic production of 4,702,619 million tons in
that year. By 1961, Cuba'sexportsto the United States were zero. See Senate
FinanceConinittee, Hearings onExtension of the Act of 1948,1965, p.
ll.Cuba'sestimated share of the world sugar trade was 28.6 percent in 1961,
and 24.67 percent in 1984. The Soviet Union replaced the limited States as the
major market for Cuban sugar in the l960s. See Tan for particulars of the
Soviet-Cuban sugar trade.
9. See Leu and Knutson for one attempt to estimate what the world price would
be in the absence of the current U.S. program. See also Landell Mills.
11By 1987, however, the world price was once again rising fairly sharply, reach-
ing about9.5cents per pound by the endofthe year despite the cutback in
American importsand continued Europeanexports.
3. Origj of the Program1°
There have been few years in American history when sugar has not been the
object of some degree of intervention. It has always been an importable.
Starting in 1796, a tariff on imports was imposed, and until the late 1800s,
revenue was the major motive for the tariff, as domestic production was less
than ten percent of consumption, with imports supplying more than 90 percent
of the U.S.market.''
Hawaii's relationship to the UnitedStates in the 1870s and 1880s was
heavily centered around sugar: a free—trade agreement with the UnitedStates
hadpernittedHawaiian sugar to be imported without duty, and hadencouraged
the expansionof Hawaiian cane growing land. The American Congress then
proceeded torescind the duty on sugar, but to paya bounty of2 cents per
pound (about the sameasthe specific tariff earlier collected and equivalent
to100percent nominal protection) to American growers. The desire to have
access to the American market at favorable prices seems to have been a major
notive behind Hawaiian accession to U. S.jurisdiction, after which the U.S.
revertedto tariff protection and Hawaii escapedthesugar tariff. From the
10. This section draws heavily on Terpstra. Only those aspectsofthe pre-1934
sugar tariff relevant for later development are discussed here. For a full ac-
count, seeTaussig1924, Part II.
11. House Agriculture Committee Hearings of 1951; Extension of the Sugar Act
of 1948. HR 4521, Pp. 34—35.Taussig attributed the expansion of sugarcane
production in Louisiana in the 19th century to the existence of the protective
tariff, and documented U.S.D.A. efforts in the late 19th century thatledto
the development of sugarbeet production in the United States. Taussig, 1924,
Chapters IV and VII.
121890s until1930, American tariff protection continued. Because theHawaiians
wereexempt from the tariff (and Cubaalsoreceived a twenty—five percent
reduction in duty)12, they benefitted from protection in the sheltered
Americanmarket.ThePhilippine sugar industry also started under the
umbrella of Americanprotection.13
TheSmoot—Hawley tariff, however, raisedthe rateof duty facedby Cuba
to 2 cents per pound (compared with a world sugar price of .73 cents a pound
in 1932), and the duty on imports from other countries to 2.5 cents per pound
for other exporting countries. In fact, however, imports from Cuba and the
Philippines met U.S. demands, and little sugar was imported from other
countries. Indeed, during some periods of the year, the sugar price fell below
the worid—price-cum duty asCubansugar wasmore than sufficient to meet
demand at that price.
Duringthe Great Depression, sugar prices fell drastically. Among other
consequences, the Cuban economy wasextremelyadversely affected, and with it,
the fortunes of American investors who owned sugar plantations there. As
part ofNew Deallegislationattempting to cope with thecrisis, the Jones
Costigan Actof 1934 was passed.Itprovided for a system of production and
marketingquotas for domestic producers and import quotas for foreigners
(almost exclusivelyCuba). The intent of the Jones-Costigan Act seems to have
been primarily to shore up the Cubaneconomy and toincrease American
producers'incomes. There was, in addition to production and import restric-
12. Cuban sugar production rose rapidly in the first three decades of the cen-
tury in response to this partial exemption. Much of the cane was planted, har-
vested, and processed (first-stage) on American-owned land and sugar mills. By
1934, itwasestimated that Americans owned 70percentof Cuban sugar produc-
ing capacity. (1934Hearings,P.106). See also House Hearings, 1952, P. 35.
13.Again, seeTaussig,Ch. 6.
13tions, provisionfor directpayment toAmericanproducers. However, therewas
also aclear intention to contain the size of the industry. ln his message to
Congress, President Roosevelt's statement wasthat:
'Steadilyincreasing sugar production.. .has created a price andmarketing
situationprejudicial to virtually everyone interested. Farmers in many areas
arethreatened with low prices for their beets and cane, and Cuban purchases
of our goods have dwindled steadily as her shipments of sugar to this country
have declined.
There is a school of thought which believes that sugar ought to
beon the free list....
"I do not at this timerecommendplacing sugar on the free list. I feel
that weoughtfirst to try out a system of quotas with the three—fold object
ofkeeping down the price of sugar to consumers, of providing for the reten-
tionof beet and cane farming within our continental limits, and also to
provide against further expansion of this necessarily expensive industry...
Like much of the New Deal legislation, the Jones—Costigan Act was passed
quickly within severaldays of its introduction and afterhearIngs lasting
only a few hours.'5For later reference, itisinteresting to note that sugar
producersopposed the initial act •Beetgrowers were particularly adamant in
their opposition as the act called for a 17 percent reduction in sugarbeet
productionfrom 1933 (See 1934 hearings, Pp. 84,118,
121,132,145, 148, 152, 167.16
14. Sugar Beets and Sugarcane as Basic Agricultural Commodities Under the
Agricultural Adjustment H.R.7907. February j, &flL House Hearings, P.
1. The Chief, Section of Sugar and Rice, Agricultural Adjustment Administra-
tion, testified that the domestic sugar industry was "an expensive one from
the point of view of
the consumer and that lies behind the freezing of sugar beet acreage." P. 13.
15. See Ibid.
16. Because sugar was an import, its regulation should have come under the
jurisdiction of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Coin-
14Even in the 1934 legislation, sugar refinerssought quotasto restrict
imports of refined sugar. They claimed that the 1930 legislation (Smoot
Hawley) left them with a cost disadvantage vis-a—vis foreign producers
(becausethe Congress had assumedthat it took one ton of raw sugar to make a
ton of refined, whereas the actual conversion ratio was more like 1.07 to
one.'7 So, quotas on imports of refined sugar were imposed to satisfy domes-
tic (second—stage)refining interests; the quota was later replaced with a
prohibition -anecessary condition for preserving the support of the sugar
refiners who imported the raw (cane) sugar and refined it in their plants.
The initially recommended quotas were set with a base equal to the
preceeding three years marketings. The average marketings over that period had
been(in millions of tons of sugar, raw value):
Continentalbeets1,450,000
Continental cane (from Louisiana and Florida) 1,260,000
Hawaiian cane 935,000
PuertoRican cane 821,000
mittee.It did come under the latter. But one of the interesting 'accidents'
with important consequences was that when the Jones-Costigan Act was first up
for renewal in 1937, the Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee re-
quested, as a favor from his colleague and friend, the Chairman of the Ways
andMeansConpnjttee, thattheHouse Agriculture Committeehandle sugarmat-
ters. The Chairman of the House Ways and Means Coimiitteeacceeded to the re-
quest, and the House Agriculture Committee has handled sugar matters ever
since.SeePrice for an account. Because there is a tax on sugar imports, only
the House may initiate legislation. This right of initiation, combined with
the fact that sugar is the only agricultural commodity considered by the
SenateFinance Committee has resulted in unusually greatpower concentrated in
thehands of the House Agriculture Committee for dealing with sugar. See the
discussion of the 1962 bill below for one instance where the Senate opposed
the House decisions but in the end was unable to prevail.
17. Johnson (P. 30) believesthat American refineries hadlosttheir compara-
tive advantageinthe 1920s and usedthe 1.07 to one conversion ratio as an
argument for protection which they needed on other grounds. Taussig 'sdocumen-
tation, however, suggests that the protection accorded to American sugar
refineries as early as the 1870s wasmore than sufficient to provide needed
protection and monopolyprofit. See his interesting discussion of the "Sugar
Trust"(Taussig, 1924, Ch. VIII). Taussig cites testimony before Congress in
1888 by the head of the AmericanSugar Refining Company (the Trust) to the ef-




Virgin Islands cane 5,000
Total 6,452,000 tons'8
Asalready indicated, the sugar growers opposed the introduction of these
quotas in 1934, feeling it was against their interests. When the bill cane up
for renewal in 1937, however, they had switched sides, and actively supported
the sugar program and production and import quotas. (See pp. 16-45 of the 1937
House Hearings). Interestingly, a representative of the United States Sugar
Corporation (based in Florida) opposed the 1937 bill on the grounds that
Florida could expandproductionand indicated a preference for unrestricted
sugar imports unless Florida's quota was increased substantially (P. 168 of
House Hearings, 1937). Louisiana growers also asked for larger quotas, while
beetproducers had not even filled their quotas under the original 1934Act.
(P.145 of 1937 Hearings). Representatives of bothPuertoRico andHawaii both
advocated the removal of restrictions on their exportation of refined sugar to
the mainland (P. 55, 106).
Thesugar program was again renewed in 1940. With the advent of the Second
WorldWar, however, it was naturally suspended as the problem became one of
increasing output, rather than controlling supply. During the war, Cuban sugar
was exported to the United States, even when American prices were below those
that could have been realized in other markets.'9.
4. The "Support Cuba" Period: 1948 -1960.
After the War, the Sugar Act was reconsidered in 1948.At that time, of
course,the world price was high (although the U.S. price was about 10 percent
above it) and the real issue was the percentaged of sugar that should be sup-
18. Data from P. 2 of House Hearings 1934.
19. Sugar Act of 1948, House Agriculture Committee Hearings of1947. Pp. 42-
44.See also Gerber for a discussion.
16plied from domestic and foreign sources. A major consideration in devising the
legislation was the moral debt owed to Cuba, because of Cuban steadfastness in
providing sugar to a wartime ally. As passed, the intent of the legislation
was to "protect foreigners' interests in the U.S. market'. This was to be ac-
complished by continuingto restrict U. S.production to 55 percent ofcon-
sumption and allocating the remaining rights to supplythe high-price U.S.
marketto foreign countries, which in practice meantprimarilyCuba.2°
By virtueof the production controls, the U.S. price would be higher than
the foreign price by more thanthetariff; rightstosell in the U. S. market
would therefore be valuable. It was clearly the intent of the administration
that these rights be directed largely towardCuba.Te Cuban share was98.64
percent of the total import rights and Cuba also received rights to unfilled
quotas of other countries. In 1949, for example, the UnitedStates imported
3.103 million tons of sugar from Cuba, 525 thousand tonsfromthe Philippines,
and56 thousand tonsfrom all other foreign countries (Senate Finance Com-
mittee Hearings,1965, P. 19).21
20. House Agriculture Cosinittee Hearings of 1951, HR 4521, Extensionof the
SugarActof1948, pp. 34—35. The 55—45 formulahad been set in the 1937 Ex—
tensionof the Jones Costigan Bill.
21. The Philippine sugar industry was initially bolstered by the Payne Aldrich
Tariff Act of 1909 which gave the Philippines the right to export 300,000 tons
duty-free to the limited States. The duty-free allotment hadthenbeen expanded
during the First World War. The Philippine production of sugar had expanded
greatly in the 1930s. According to the U. S. Tariff Commission, "the most
rapid expansion in both acreage andproductionoccurred in the years 1932-34,
whenthe question ofPhilippine independence was being debated by Congress.
Inasmuchas the several independence bills then under consideration provided
for quotas on sugar to be allocated to individual mills and to planters on a
production basis, there was an incentive to increase output and hence quota
allotments. As a result, Philippine sugar production reacheda peak of
1,509,000short tons in 1934. Since that year it has declined because of the
quota provisions of the Jones-Costigan Act and the Independence act." U.S.
Tariff Commission, P. 45. After the Second WorldWar, the Philippines were
againto be favored with quotas; initially, however, it was recognized that
war damages would prevent their filling their quotas and the unfilled portion
was allocated to Cuba.
17It is perhaps significant that only one sugar consumer testified in 1948:
the American Bakers Association sut4uitted a short letter indicating its sup-
port of a one-year extension of the Sugar Act, and urging a study of the ef-
fects of the sugar program (P. 54 of House Hearings).
The sugar program was changed very little throughout the 1950s. Cuba's
share of imports fell somewhat as other countries' production increased, but
remained at 3.4 million tons in 1958, contrasted with 980 thousand tons from
thePhilippines and 291 thousand tons from all other foreign sources. The
Sugar Act wasrenewed in 1951to continue through 1956, andit was againex-
tended in 1956to last through 1960. The1956extension differed from the ear-
lier ones in that production quotas for U.S. producers were increased along
with foreign quotas, so that American producers would maintaintheir share in
theAmericanmarket.Thereafter, market growth in excess of 8,350,000 tons was
tobe shared 55-45 between domestic andforeignproducers.22
Asan indication of how complex formulae canbecome, the 55 percent addi-
tional domestic production quotas were to be distributedas follows: of the
first 165,000 tons of increased quota, 51.5 percent was to go to sugarbeet and
48.5percent to mainland cane; the next 20,000 and2,000tons were to go to
Puerto Rico andtheVirgin Islands respectively, and increases in excess of
188,000 tons were to be allocated in proportion to the initial quota allot-
ments. (Ibid., P. 37).For foreign countries' 45 percent additional alloca-
tions, 43.2 percent was to go to Cuba, and1.8percent to other foreign
countries in 1956, while in subsequent yearsCubawas to receive 29.59 percent
and15.41percent was to go to other foreign countries: the Philippines,
22. Data are fromU.S.House of Representatives, Commitee on Ag, The
UnitedStates Program, 1971, P. 37.
18however, was not to receive any change in quota. Meanwhile, if any domestic
areas failed to fill their quotas, these should be reallocated to other domes-
tic areas and Cuba only.
During the 1950s, acreages allocated to cane and sugarbeet in the United
States remained relatively constant, but production increased somewhat due to
rising yields. In 1950, 406,000 acres of cane and 924,000 acres of sugarbeet
had been harvested with yields of 34.9 tons and 14.7 tons per acre respec-
tively. By 1960, 406,600 acresof landwere devoted to sugarcane and 897,000
acres were devoted to sugarbeet. Yields had risen respectively to 40.0 and
18.7 tons per acre.23
5. Expanding Domestic Production and Acreage, 1962 to 1974
5.1. The Battle over the Cuban
A major shift occurred after1959, however, asAmerican relations with Cuba
soured. A first step was to amend the earlier legislation to permit the Presi-
dent of the United States to determine the Cuban quota for the period June
1960 to June 30, 1962, and to permit imports from alternative sources not to
exceedthe amountby which the Cuban quota was reduced. Cuba's quota was
thereupon reduced to zero from July 1960.
A political battle over the future of government policy toward sugar then
ensued. The original motives for the 1948 Act were no longer valid. (ie solu-
tion, advocated by economists in the Administration and outside the govern-
ment, would have been to abandon quotas both on domestic production and on im-
ports, and to permit a return to free markets; if not that, at least a global
quota (rather than country-specific allocations) would have made sense and
were in fact finally supported by the Kennedy Administration. The domestic
23. Data are from USDA ERS 1985.
19growers, and especially beet growers, however, seized the opportunity to urge
that their production quotas be increased to make up part of the Cuban short-
fall, and advocated a continuation of the program.24 It should be noted,
however,thatfrom an economicself—intereststandpoint,domesticproducers
andprocessors had an interest in restricting imports, butit isnot evident
thatcountry-specific quotas were in any regard more favorable than a global
quota.
However,interests of the refiners of raw (i.e. cane) sugar did diverge
fromthose of growers of cane and sugarbeet,and from those of beet and cane
millers: reducing the quantity of raw sugar imported and increasing domestic
produotion would necessarily reduce economic activity for raw sugar (cane)
refiners. For mostof the (second-stage) refinors ofcane were locatcd
primarilyin coastal areas, where imports of raw Cuban sugar (once-processed
cane) had oncebeen refined. Insofar as domestic beet would substitute for im-
ported cane, new sugarbeet processing capacity would be built near beet grow-
ing areas, and second—stage cane refiners would not receive raw cane sugar in
quantitiescommensurate with their capacity.
AfterCuba lost her quotas,the Chairmanof the House Agriculture Committee
apparentlywanted to reassign a large share of the Cuban quota to the
Dominican Republic, at the sane time as the State Department waspreparing
sanctionsagainst the Dominican Republic (under Trijillo). As described by
Cater,
24. It should be recalledthat the early l960s were a time of"surplus produc-
tion'tof agricultural commodities under agricultural price support programs.
This enabled advocates of expanded sugar growing areas to argue that enactment
would reduce the extent of surpluses of other commodities. For an account of
the political forces that determined theoutcome in 1962, see Berman and
Heineman.
20'Quite astruggle ensued.Fora period,itremaineddoubtfulwhose foreign
policy would prevail -theU.S. government's or the sugarsubgovernment's.
ChairmanCooley forced a temporaryincrease of the Dominican quota, but the
U.S.Treasury slapped a special tax on it. With the change of Administrations
in 1960, Executive resources were wheeled into the battle, Attorney General
Robert Kennedy made itknownthat he was examining the spending habits of the
affluent Dominican lobbyists for evidence of "improper" efforts at
persuasion.. .At long last, Mr. Cooley retreated, arid soon afterward General
Trujillo fell. ...DespitePresident Kennedy's desire to move toward a 'global
quota" purchased at noripremium pricess, the old arrangement.. .has been
preserved largely intact.' (Cater, P. l9_20).25
Although opposition to the bill arose both from those opposing giving
something of value to foreigners and from those who wanted to protect domestic
growers, the Sugar Act of 1962 nonetheless passed in a form which enlarged
and/or extended quotas to other foreign producers but simultaneously allowed
for increases in domestic production.26 Thus, total acres of cane and beet
harvested rose from 1,370,000 in 1960 to 2,065,000 in 1970.27
25. The 1962 Congressional Almanac commented that "Although sugar legislation
is not a partisan issue, it has touched off some major Congressional battles
in recent years. In general, the Senate has supported the Administration,
while the House has followed the lead of its Agriculture Committee, where
sugarlegislation originates.
In1962, the Administration and the House were in accord on increasing
domestic quotas, but differed sharply over the foreign quota provisions, with
te Administration resisting reassignment of a portion of the reserved Cuban
quota to other countries on a permanent basis, and the House supporting such
reassignment. ..Acontroversy arose over the role of lobbyists representing
foreign interests, who stood to gain large fees if their clients' countries
received quotas. ..1962Congressional Quarterly Almanac, P. 128. I am indebted
to Rick Harper for calling this article to my attention.
26. The version passed in the Senate was considerably more liberal than that
passed in the House, but it was the House's version that survived the con-
ference committee. See Berman and Heineman for an account.
27. Almost all of this increase took place on the U. S. mainland. Acreage
planted in Hawaii rose about 200,000 acres between 1960 and 1970. However,
acreage and production in Puerto Rico declined over this period, apparently
21The 1962 Amendments to the Sugar Act of 1948 included a provision under
which there would be acreage allotnents granted to yield 65,000 short tons,
rawvalue of beet sugar. Localities were to be selected without regard to
earlier producing history,in accordance with the following criteria:
"firmnessof capital commitment for construction of factory facilities,
need for a cash crop, distance from other producing localities, suitability
for sugarbeet production and accessibility to sugar markets.
157,000 acres were committed to localities in which six new beet mills
would be constructed, and another 15,000 acres were allotted in areas where
existing mills were thought to have additional capacity.26 Over $20 million
was invested in additional beet refining capacity. The designated localities
were Mendota, California (1963), Herefore, Texas (1964), Drayton, North
Dakota (1965), Montezuma, New York (1965), Easton, Maine (1966) and Chandler,
Arizona (l966).29
Cane production and milling capacity were also expanded: during the l960s,
eight mew raw sugar mills were constructed in Florida, so that there were nine
large mills in 1970 compared to three in 1960.
due to the high costs of production relative to other U. S. sources. It is
difficult to determine the reason for Puerto Rico's apparemt cost disad-
vantage. Sugar was grown on small farms in Puerto Rico, and it is probable
thatscale economies, combined with rising real wages in Puerto Rico resulted
inunprofitability of the crop. There is some discussion of Puerto Rico in the
House Agriculture Hearings of 1974 on the Sugar Act Extension of 1974, p. 293.
28. U.S.H.R. "The United States Sugar Program", 1971. P. 39.
29. Thirty six Congressmen were om the House Agriculture Committee for the
87th Congress The Chairman was from North Carolina and the Vice Chairman from
Texas. There was no CongressmanfromArizona om the Committeeandthere were
Congressmenfrom states with more apparent suitability for sugarbeet produc-
tion than some of those mentioned above. (Committee membership included a rep-
resentative from Idaho, two from Kansas, two from Iowa, and two from
Oklahoma.) There were three Congressmen on the committee from cane—growing
states (Hawaii, Louisiana, and Florida) .See 1961 Congressional Quarterly Al-
manac, p. 48.
225.2 Administration of the Program
The Sugar Act was renewed, with amendments, until 1974. There were dif-
ficulties in both administration and enforcement during these years. For ex-
ample, sugar tended to be shipped to the United States early in the quota
period, leaving U.S. refiners with storage problems. The U.S. Department of
Agriculturetherefore began restricting the amount of sugar that could be im-
ported under quota in the first part of the year.3°
There wasalsoa problem of how to keep domestic acreage within the desired
limits. For some regions, including Hawaii for the entire post—war periodand
Puerto Rico after 1956, this was not anissue as prices were not sufficiently
highto induce increased plantings. For other areas, however, the Secretary of
Agriculture was to determine proportionate shares to be allocated to in-
dividual farms. These shares were the fraction of a region's allotment that
could be produced by the individual farm. These proportionate shares were en-
forced by a 'conditional payment' granted to farmers staying within their al-
lotments, which constituted an important part of their income. Farmers could
feed excess cane or beet to livestock without penalty but could not sell it
to the mill; the mill, in turn, could buy itlegallybut would not have been
able to market it and therefore had no incentive to do so.
This,in turn, caused difficulties inareas where it appeared there would
be excess production, because each producer wanted to sell to the mill before
the mill's allotmentwas exhausted. Whenthis happened, "panic selling"
started.To stop this, the Secretary of Agriculture was entitled to impose
Marketing Allotments for individual farms, indicating the proportion of each
farmer's crop that could be sold to the mill.
30.HouseAgriculture Committee, The United States Program,op.cit.,
23Then, too, criteria hadtohe established for the allocation of foreign
quotas." These included:
I. There must be friendly governments with which the United States had
diplomatic relations, which did notdiscriminate against ,\merican citizens and
which indemnified for any property expropriated.
2. "Dependability as a source of sugar supplyas reflected in the
country'shistory in supplying the U.S. market, its maintenance of sugar in-
ventories and its potcntial for supplying additional sugar upon call during
critical periods of short supply.' (U.S. Sugar Program, P. 49)
3.Thecountry' s imports from the UnitedStates,with particular atten-
tion toits imports of agricultural commodities.
4."Need of the country for a premium priced market .. . including
(a)reference to the extent it shares im other premium priced markets,32 (b)
its relative dependence on sugar as a source of foreign exchange, and
(c)present stage of and need for economic development). (Ibid., p. 49).
5. "Extent to which benefits of participation of this market areshared
by factories and larger land owners with farmers andworkerstogether with
other socio-economic policies in the quota countries." (p. 49 again)
6. Location of country, including considerations of how supplies might be
affected in case of emergencies.
31. There were also criteria for the allocation of quota deficits, but these
were even specific with respect to the country in deficit, and are not covered
here.
32. This wasprimarilya reference to sugar exports tothe United Kingdom under
the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement.
24There were also provisions for the imposition of' quotas upon the importa-
tion of sugar-containing products in the event it was determined that these
uouldaffect the U.S. sugar market and the implementation of the program.
Finally, there was even quota—exempt sugar importation, for the following
situations:
'1. The first tenshorttons, rawvalue,of sugar or liquid sugar im-
ported fromany foreign country, other than Cuba and the Republic of the
Philippines";
2. The first ten short tons, raw value, of sugar or liquid sugar imported
from any foreign country, other than Cuba and the Republic of the Philippines,
for religious, sacramental, educational, or experimental purposes;
3) Liquid sugar, imported from any foreign country, other than Cuba and the
Republic of the Philippines, in individual sealed containers of such capacity
as determined not in excess of one and one-tenth gallons each; and
4) any sugar or liquid sugar imported, brought in, or produced or manufac-
tured in the United States (a) for livestock feed or for the production of
livestock feed, or (b) for the distillation of alcohol (including all
polyhydricalcohols), or (c) for theproduction (other than by distillation)
ofalcohol, including all polyhydricalcohols, but not including any alcohol
or resulting by-products for human food consumption or (d) for export as sugar
or in sugar-containing products." (U.S. Sugar Program., p. 64).
5.3 Interest Groups
These administrative complications notwithstanding, the Sugar Act con-
tinued to be approved, with amendments until l974. Long before that, various
groups initeres ted in the sugar program had organized themselves. There was a
33.TheChairman of.the House Agriculture Bill introduced one set of amend-
merits to the bill to the House with the introductory statement that the bill
was so complex that no one could understand it,anditwould.be necessary for
Congressmen to take his word for it!
25Sugar Users Group (consisting of bakers, soft drink bottlers, candy and con-
fectionary manufacturers, etc.) arid a Sugar Producers (the growers, millers,
and refiners) Group, growers associations in all the main regions, associa-
tions of refiners (of imported raw sugar) and of beet mill operators, and so
Foreign lobbyists wore also important. Cater, in his Washington expose of
1964, focussed inter alia on the "sugar subgovernment". As he described it,
"since the early l930s, this agricultural conuaodity has been subject to a
cartel arrangement sponsoredbythe government. Byspecificprescription, the
sugarmarket is divided to the last spoonful among domestic cane and beet
growers, and foreign suppliers. Ostensibly to insure "stability" of supply,
theU.S. price is pegged at a level considerably above the competitive price
in the world market...
Political power within the sugar subgovernment is largely vested in the
Chairman of the House Agricultural Committee who works out the schedule of
quotas.It is shared by a veteran civil servant.. .who provides the necessary
"expert"advice for such a complex marketing arrangement. Further advice is
provided by Washington representatives of the domestic beet arid cane sugar
growers,the sugar refineries, and the foreign producers." (Cater, P. 18)
6. Cessation of the pg 1974and the Era of No Program, 1974-1981
During 1973—74, the price of sugar skyrocketed, rising from 9.61 cents per
pound on the world market in 1973 to 44.97 cents per pound at the end of 1974,
havingreached a high of 57.17 cents in November of that year. The Sugar Act
was up for renewal arid came to a vote during the period of high prices. At
that time, the U.S. price was a little below the world price, so that the
quotas to recipient countries were valueless and there was no protection to
American producers. Indeed, there wasdiscussionin the hearings as to whether
26it was reasonable to expect Hawaiians to ship raw sugar to the mainland when
they would receive a higher price in Japan. Simultaneously,consumer groups
wereprotestinghigh retail sugar prices, which reached a dollar a pound at
Lheretaillevelat about the timethehearings were held.
TheNational Consumer Congress testified infavor of failing to renew the
SugarAct, eliminating all quotas, and going instead to an income—support
basisfor sugar growers. The consumer group also advocated efforts to reach an
international agreement to stabilize sugar prices.3
The Department of Agriculture supported extension of the Sugar Act, but
wanted to end domestic quotas and direct payments.Italso requested a 3-year
extension (only) of the program, with the stated intent of considering waysof
bringing the sugar program under general agricultural legislation. TheSugar
UsersGroup recommended a two-year extension of the program, and advocated a
wide corridor for the price targets of the Secretary of Agriculture. Simul-
taneously, it opposed bringing other sweeteners under the program or control-
ling them in any way. The National Confectioners Association also supported
extension of the bill, but advocated quotas on imports of conectionary imports
as an essential part of the legislation.
Thus,support still appeared strong for a sugar program, but it was less
cohesive than had earlier been the case and the various producer and user
groups could not agree on what they wanted.The House Agricultural Committee
passed abill, but it was defeated on the House Floor, andtheSugar Act was
notrenewed. As a consequence, sugar waswithouta special program. It still
34. See Council on Wage andPriceStability, 1975.
35.HouseHearings 1974, p. 164.
27fell under the general provisions applicable to agricultural commodities,
however arid thus remained subject to agricultural prpice supports. In addition
thereremained a duty on imported sugar.
During the early iO7Os, a technology for producing a virtually-perfect
substitute for sugar in liquid uses from corn (high fructose corn syrup —
liftS)was developed. Until the high sugar prices of 1973—74, however, it was
uneconomic relative to sugar. With those prices, however, HFCS came to be
produced in increasing quantities andtobe used instead of sugar in some com-
mercial uses.
In 1978, a new sugar act was proposed. For the first time, the sugar
ref iners testified against it. The representatiave of the U.S. Cane Sugar
Refiners Association wasasked whether the refiners had not earlier supported
legislation.The response was:
"Yes and of course that was prior to the new FII?CS technology which com-
pletely changes it. It is an entirely different ballgame.. ."(SenateHearings,
P. 140). Simultaneously, the Sugar Users Group advocated joining the Interna-
tionalSugar Association with deficiency paymentsto growers if the price fell
outof the International Sugar Association Range. This would have permitted
sugarprices to industrial users and consumers to move with the international
price and have supported farmers' incomes. The Sugar Users Group further op-
posed quotas, and advocatedfeeson imports, if necessary, rather thanquotas.
Thus, by 1978, with the increasing competition from HFCS(seeTable 2), the
unanimity of interests represented by growers, processors, refiners and users
broke down completely. In these circumstances, the administration decided to
have the United States join the International Sugar Organizationas its
proposedassistance to domestic sugar interests.36
36. The UnitedStatesdid join the International Sugar Organization, which set
13 to 23 cents perpoundraw value as its target price range. As can be seen
from Table 1, the ISA was unable to prevent the price from exceeding this
28Although action was proposed repeatedly in the mid-1970s as the world price
ofsugar fell, no bill passedin those years. In 1978 and 1979, price supports
wereput into effect under general agricultural legislation, but in the fol-
lowing two years, the world price of sugar (see Table 1) once again soared,
rising from 9.66 cents per poundin 1979 to 41.09 cents perpound in Qtober
1980, and then falling almost as precipitously to 16.32 cents per pound by
July l98l.'
7. The pgp Program of the l980s.
It was while the price of sugar was high that a mew sugar program was
passed. Unlike earlier measures, however, the sugar programwastreatedas
partof the overall Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, rather than as a
separate piece of legislation. The new program set domestic price support
levels for the period 1982 to 1985, with an interim support level until March
1982 of 16.75 cents per pound.38 No quotas were set on imports, as it was an—
range during 1980-81 and couldnot prevent its fall below the target rangein
1982.
37. Data are from Terpstra, P. 4
38. The Administration had not advocated a support price for sugar, but ap-
parently acceptedit in return for support for other legislation, probably in
part becauseitwas not anticipated that the world sugar price would fall so
drasticallyor so soon. The Senate had passed a supportbill, at an initial
price of
16.50cents apound; theHouse had rejected an amendment that would have made
the price 18 cents a pound for the 1982 crop, and had then voted down the
program. But sugar price supports were passed as part of the 1981 farm program
after the particulars had been worked out in conference coninittee. Loans until
theend of March 1982 were to be madeat therate of 16.75 cents perpound raw
basis and 19.70 cents per pound of refined beet sugar. The Secretary of
Agriculture was instructed to set the price for the 1982 crop at a level not
less than 17 cents a pound, for the 1983 crop at 17.5 cents a pound, at 17.75
cents for 1984 and at 18.00 cents for 1985. Growers could get a loan at these
prices from the CCC, and decide not to reclaim their produce, which in effect
meant that theywould repay only if the price rose above the support level.
TheCCC cannot sell ooinmodities it is holding at less than 1.05 times the pur-
chase price.
29ticipated that the support price could be maintained by altering the tariff
and feeapplicable to sugar imports (which the President was authorized to do
under existing legislation). It was anticipated that the purchase price would
notbe attractiverelative to the world price, andthat the domestic price
could be adequately supported through import duties and fees .Oneamendment
to the bill, which was adopted, prohibited the financing of the sugar program
from government revenue sources. Thus, the CCC could not buy sugar that would
not be repurchased by farmers, for it would have had to take a loss to do so.
Once the law was passed, a number of market reactions enused. There were
unusually large imports at the end of 1981 in anticipation of the higher
tariffs that would be imposed.4° Also, by late May, the Department of Agricul-
ture had to issue regulations that a sugar processor could not sell more to
the government than the minimum he had had on hand over the preceeding six-
month interval. A Washington Post article suggested that sugar processors had
deposited more sugar with the ftC than they in fact had with the intent of
forcing the government to impose quotas •4
1
Asthe sugar price fell on world markets, it became apparent that the
CommodityCredit Corporation would end up holding some sugar that it had
receivedfrom farmers inreturnfor loans.Thetariff had already been in-
creasedto the maximum extentpermissible by law (50 percent of the world
price). As theworldprice fell, (see Table 1) it becameevidentthat main-
tenance of the support prices mandated by the 1981 law would not be possible
without CCC purchases of crops that would not be repurchased by growers unless
other action was taken. Since CCC retention was inconsistent with the amend—
39. See Terpstra, 1982.
40. See Terpstra, 1932, P. 8.
41. Washington Post, June 6, 1982.
30meat requiring no budgetary cost from the program, something had to be done.
In 1ay, emergency quarterly import quotas were established on a country-by-
country basis to avoid a loss to the Treasury" 42
Atthat time, it was estimated that the "cost of production' of sugar was
about 21-22 cents per pound in the United States. Production was decreasing in
Hawaii and insugarbeetgrowing areas, and millswere in fact closing down,
Therewere no production ceilings on any U.S. source.43
Import quotas were established un the basis of average deliveries over the
preceeding years whenentryhadbeenfree, Thiswasdone to attempt to insure
conformity with thenondiscriminatory clauses of GAfl pertaining to the in-
positionof quotas.44
As canbeseen from the price disparities in Table1, the divergence be-
tween American sugar prices and world prices were now so great that dif-
ficulties were bound to ensue. From the raw sugar (cane) refiners' viewpoint,
a major difficulty was that quarterly quotas prevented anyfuturescontracts.
42.One ofthe precipitating factors blamedbythe administration for its
inability to maintain the domestic sugar price at the legally mandatedlevel
withoutCCC purchases was the fact that somesugarwasbeingimported under
the Generalized System of Preferences, under which some developing countries
were permittedtoexport to the U.S. at less than normal duty rates. Since
most sugar imports camefromdeveloping countries, the GSP legislation under-
mined the effectiveness of the tariff. The Administration also pointed to the
EuropeanCommunity sugar policy as a source of excess supply on the world
market, and hence of the declining world price. Later on, a similar policy
dilemmaarose between the CaribbeanBasinInitiative andsugar price supports.
43.See Terpstra, 1982, p. 10
44. Until 1974, the United States could impose quotas legally under GAflbe-
causeits agricultural legislation had been in effect from GAfl'sinitiation
andhad therefore been subject to "grandfathering'. However,quotas had to be
nondiscriminatoryto qualify when they were reimposed in 1981, as grandfather-
ing no longer applied. When American policy toward Nicaragua shifted, the Ad-
ministrationeliminated the Nicaraguansugar quota. Nicaragua sued theUnited
Statesin the International Court of Law and won its case, although the United
States failed to provide redress.
31They therefore the Government before the U.S. Court of International Trade.
The Court, however, ruled in favor of the U. S. government, so quarterly im-
port quotas persisted. .4
Atleast six Presidential proclamations hadto be issued between 1982 and
1983 to attempt to contain the side effects. Among the more interesting was
the effects on trade with Canada. Canada had no protection on sugar and im-
ported it at world prices. The Canadians at first added 6 percent corn syrup
to sugar, since anything less than 94 percent sugar was not "sugar" from the
viewpoint of the regulations. This was then shipped to northern U.S. points
and sold to U.S. producers of sugar-containing preducts. When these shipments
reached 175 thousand tons a year, they were banned. Then, Canadian firms
began producing high—sugar content cake mixes and other products, which were
exported to the United States where, once again, the sugar was extracted.
Canadians firms also shipped sugar into the U.S. as "packets of cocoa and
tins of maple syrup and in Aunt Hetty's Patent Pancake Mix" (quoted from the
Economist,cited below). These, too, were banned. However,other countries' ex-
ports of sweet preducts to the U. S. also rose, so thatbyJanuary 1985 emer-
gencyimport quotas were placed on all imports of sweetened cocoa, cake mixes
andedible preparations. This latter category wasfilledby March 5, 1985,
meaning that no Korean noodles (.002 percent sugar), kosher pizzas, or other
preductswith any sugar could be imported for the remainder of the year
importprohibitions were put on all sugar—containing products after these, and
other, responses to the price differential had been felt. Noteworthy were the
45. Terpstra, 1982, P. 15
46. See Ecomomist, June 1, 1985, P. 31 of American Survey.
32protests of candy producers, after imports of confectionary products rose from
39,850 tonsin1980 to 95,553 metric tons in 1985: candy producers had been
part of the Users' Group which earlier had supported the sugar program.47
Data in Tables 1 to 3tell the story thereafter. Support prices were
set, and import quotas established at levels designed to achieve them.
However, the substitutability of HFCS was so great that sugar consumption
began declining 1Drecipitous1'. All American soft drink bottlers shifted to
HFOS by 1985. Sugar accounted for less than half of all aloric sweetener con-
simiption by 1985, when its price had risen to 5 times the world price.
By 1987, U.S. imports had fallen to an estimated 1.48 million tons of raw
sugar,down from 5 million tonsas recently as 1979 arid 1981.Estimates of the
total cost of sugar support rangedfrom$800 million to $2.5 billion, depend-
ingon the estimated world price in the absence of the program, with payments
persugar farm estimated to be l36,000. More than half of all caloric
sweetener consumption was now high fructose corn syrup, andthe proportion
continuedto increase. Moreover, in1987, it wasannounced that a technique
for mnkingcrystalline dry cornsweetener had been discovered.
On existing trends, it is expectedthatthe United States will stop import-
ing sugar in either 1988 or 1989. As earlier mentioned, import quotas for 1988
have beenset at 750,000 tons, half the 1986level. Whenthereare no longer
anyimportsthe policy choices available to the politicians will change and
theircosts will rise. If sugar prices are to be maintained at their present
47. SeeU •S.D .A.,Foreign Agricultural Circular,Sugar, Molassesand
FS2—86, November 1986, Pp. 18—24 for a listing of the 113 significant
proclamations, Presidential signatures, notices filed, andUSDAannouncements
pertaining to sugar over the l982-•S period. See also Council of Economic
Añvisers,Economic Report of the President, 1987, P. 165.
33levels, either stocks will have to mount or subsidized exports will have to
start. If the political process is unwilling to accept either of these two op-
tions, price supports will have to be lowered.48
8.ThePolitical Economy of the Sugar Program
Nocase can ever prove a rule, and thesugar program is no exception. Like
everythiagelse, sugar is unique,and its uniqueness has undoubtedly in-
fluencedtheevelutien of intervention in the sugar market ever the years.
Nonetheless,one can ask certain questions which pertain to the various models
outlinedin Sect. 1, and venturehypotheses as to some missing ingredients.
Questions which nay shed light on the appropriateness of the competing under-
lying models include: 1) who gained and who lost under the sugar program? 2)
did all parties act rationally in their own self—interest?; and 3). to what
extentdoes the conservative social welfare function model,theBecker model,
theBrock-Nageetrade—off model between votes and lobbyists,the Olson free—
ridermodel, or the Bhagwati-Srinivasan revenue seeking approach capture the
essentialsof sugar ccntrcls? The answer to the third question really points
43,Thissection was written in December 1987. On January 7, 1988, the New
VbrkTimes,underthe headline "Buried in Spending Law"reportedthat Senator
Incuye (Hawaii), with the 'backing of domestic caneandbeet sugar growers",
?isd succeeded in getting a little-noticed provision into the $600 billion
spending bill to permitanaddition 400,000 tons of sugar —inaddition to the
750,000 quota —importsinto the United States in 1988 "to offset the impact
en foreign producers of drastic cuts in American sugar imports in recent
years." The additional 400,000 tons, allocated to the Caribbean and the
Philippines, is to be imported at American prices, refined, and may not be
sold in the United States, i.e., it must be reexported at world prices. The
1980 Qanibus spending bill allotted $100,000,000 million to cover the finan-
cial loss under this program, equal to 12 cents per pound). Obviously, this
additional sugar will increase the capacity utilization rate in domestic sugar
refineries. The New York Times was silent on the issue of how the additional
imported cane would be allocated between refineries. It would therefore appear
that the final paragraph of this section was too optimistic: a new instrument
has been created under which the United States can import raw sugar and reex-
portthat, which will makeit relatively straightforward to reexport domestic
surpluses when domestic production exceeds consumption.
34to some missing elements in existing models which may be important for under-
standing political controls over economic activity. These include importantly:
4)institutional bottlenecks to achieving a Pareto—superior solution; 5) the
interaction between economic markets andpoliticalmarkets?; and6)the role
of knowledge, andoftechnocracy, ininfluencingcontrols. These issues are
consideredin turn in this section.
8.1 Who Gained and Who Lost?
Allthe available evidence suggests that most American sugar landearns
no more than it would in alternative uses. The only possible exception is
Hawaii, which will be discussed further below. Even with the relatively high
sugar prices of recent years, there has been little expansion of acreage
devotedto cane andactualcontraction of acreage devoted to beet.
Moreover, this does not appear to be an entirely new situation. In 1974,
Johnson concluded that the sugar program was an evil system, costing between
$500 and$730million, depending onwhetherthe premium per poundwas 1.5 or
2.5 cents(Johnson, p.50). This contrasted with gross farm income from sugar
at that time of about $870 million.49
Johnson estimated that the average income per sugar farm in 1972 was
$619,856 in Florida, $312,611 in Hawaii, $75,089 in Louisiana, and above
$30,000 in all sugar-producing states except Puerto Rico, Colorado, Montana,
Nebraska, Utah, Michigan, and Ohio.There were altogether 175thousand produc-
49. Johnson, Pp. 54—55. Johnson's estimates excluded Puerto Rican and
Hawaiian-grown sugar.They were based on the assumption of a 2 cent a pound
quota premiumina&Iition to the tariff. Taussig believed thatnomainland
acreage was profitable for sugar,givenalternative uses, and attributed the
deve1opientof sugarcane acreage in Louisiana to American protectionin the
nineteenthcentury. See Taussig,l9l5, Ch. IV.
35tion workers in 1971, but their average hourly earnings (both in growing and
processing) were significantly below the average for persons with comparable
training andskillsin each state.
Johnson concluded that
the net benefits —thenet increase in income going to farm—owned
resources —areonly a small fraction of the gross benefits. Most of the gross
transfers are required because the U.S. is a high—cost producer of sugar.
Manyresourcesare used insugarproduction that would readily find employment
elsewhere. ..Muchof the gross transfer is required to induce these resources
tobe devoted to sugar production rather than their next best
alternative...(Johnson,P. 58)
Turningto analyze beet and caneseparately,Johnsonfound no evidence that
the price of sugar beet land (near mills) was significantly different than the
pricing of other land in beet growing areas. He notes that:
"I must admit that these results surprised me. I had expected to find some
positIve effect.. .There has been considerable political pressure to establish
new sugar beet producing areas, and it seemed reasonable to assume that
faraers expected to gain from these efforts.. .(P. 61) Of the six new beet
processingplants established after 1962, 2 (New York and Maine) were
'complete failures" (because they could not obtain enough sugar beets to
onerate).The acreageallotted to sugarbeets in Arizona hadbeenonly half
thatanticipated when the plant was built (P. 61). Moreover, the Secretary of
Agriculture had not, at that time or since, had to impose "proportionate al—
lothsents" on any producing area since 1966.
Asfor cane, Puerto Rican production and acreage had been declining for a
decade at the tine of Johnson's analysis. For Hawaii, most benefits went to
the large producers, as noted abeve, as 25 out of the 705 sugar farms produced
93 percent of the sugar.50 In addition, field worker wages in Hawaii were
36double tile national average and Johnson concluded that "it is quite possible
that some of the economic rent from sugar production in Hawaii has been cap-
tured by approximately 5,000 farm workers."(p. 67)51
Duringthel970s, more beet and caneprocessingplants went bankrupt.USDA
datashow 58 beet processing factories operating in 1970, 56 operating in
1975, 43 operating in 1980, and 36 operating in 1986. There were 75 sugar
mills processing cane in 1970, and the number fell to 42 by 1986.52
Certainly,refiners of imported raw cane sugar lostfrom the sugar program,
at least starting with 1970 and the increased inroads of HFCS. Some went
bankrupt, and the total demand for their product fell sharply as beet and
sugarsubstitutes replaced importedraw cane sugar.
There is little reason to question Johnson's conclusions today. Indeed,
subsequent bankruptcies, the failure of the industry to expand despite greater
protection and higher prices relative to some other crops, all suggest that
most of the cost of the sugar program was absorbed by the excess cost of
production.Indeed, even the argumentfirst put forthin 1934 ——thatthe
United States should have some domestic production capability in the event
that foreign supplies were disrupted ---no longer seems compelling in light of
the HFCS substitution possibilities.53
50.Johnson noted the disappearance of data on size of sugar farmsinHawaii
from the Census of Agriculture starting in 1969 (Johnson, P. 66).
51. Taussig, 1915, pointed to innigrant workers as the chief gainers in Hawaii
from sugar protection, asserting that native Hawaiians, like native Americans,
would not work in cane fields. Taussig, 1915, Ch. 5, P. 65.
52. See gg and Sweeteners Outlook and Situation, June 1987, Tables 19 and
20. Total sugar capacity remained approximately constant as those mills still
producingwere handling larger average volumes.
53.And if concern had genuinely been over the adequacy of foreign supplies,
onewonders why distant, landlocked SubsaharanAfricancountries should have a
quota.
37If therewere gainers,theywould have been Hawaiiangrowers(whoarelow-
cost relativeto the mainland). But there, strong unions apparently ap-
propriated most of the rents from higher sugar prices for the plantation
workers, who thereforewere the chief Hawaiian gainers.Sincemost workers are
immigrants,they should not have a significant political voice.54 It is inter-
estingto speculate on the type ofpolitical-market model that would yield an
outcomein which the chief gains from controls had no voice or vote in the
decisions to adopt those controls.
8.2The Rationality of the Actors
Oneofthe fundamental assumptions of economists is that individuals are
rational in their ownselfinterest. Even with individual rationality, of
course, a group does not necessarily maximize as models of the prisoners'
dilcimna readily demonstrate.
There are two issues here. First, how well did the representatives of the
various interests (cane and beet growers, cane millers, beet refiners, andraw
canesugarrefiners) know their owninterests?Second, was the collective
outcomerational, in the sense that policies could have been devised that ren-
dered all concerned better off?
In the sane way that more alternatives are always preferable to fewer,
there must have been short—run gains to those already growing sugar, or with
the possibility of growing beet or cane, from the sugar program at most points
in time. That does not, of course, prove that the gains were maximized. For
example, had the sugar program in 1981 been established to provide deficiency
payments to farmers (compensating for the difference bewtween the price
54. Taussig noted this sane apparent anomoly, thmt immigrant workeres were the
chief beneficiaries, in his analysis of the sugar program. At that time, he
concluded that the refiners had also gained, at least temporarily, through
their formation of the trust.
38received by them and a target support price), HEtS could not have made the in-
roads it did on sweetener consumption. Althoughonecanpointto this policy
instrument as beingclearlysuperior on economic grounds in the long run to
support prices in the presence of the HFCS alternative, one canstillclaim
rationalityfor the sugar interests IF it is claimed that they feared the
transparency of deficiency payments.
If, however, there is aneed for obscurity in programs suchas American
sugar,then the role of knowledge becomes important, since to assert a need
for obscurity is equivalent to asserting the necessity of hiding what is in
facthappening.55.
Moreover, even then, it seems apparent that many of the gains of the
sugarprogramprior to the 1970s did not go to American interests: many for-
eign countries weregainers.56Certainly there was considerable political op-
position aroused by the activities of foreign lobbyists, especially in 1962
when they were widely blamed for having achieved the 1962 reimposition of
country-specific quotas .'Onemight have thought the domestic sugar interests
55. See Sect. 8.6 below. There is also a question as to why attempts were not
made to prohibit HFtS. While this relates to the transparency issues as well,
other factors were also involved. See below for a discussion.
56. They did not gain by the full amount of the premium timestheirquota, of
courseandsome withsmall quotas into the American market probably lost. For
most countries, sugar wassoldbothtothe United States at premium prices and
onthe residual world market at much lower prices. To the (considerable) ex-
tent thatthe world price would have been higher in the absence of American
quotas,only those sugar exporters gained whose quantity exported to the
UnitedStatestimes the premium exceeded the quantity they exported to the
rest of the world times the amountbywhich the world price was below its no-
sugar-program level. However, itwasnot until 1985 that anyforeignrepresen-
tative inWashington publicly opposed the program.
57.See Berman and Heineman. Since focus here is on domestic economic-
political interactions, many of the irrationalities involved in the allocation
of foreign sugar quotas are ignored here. Suffice it to note that the
DominicanRepulbicunder Trujillo was the big gainer from the 1962 legislation
at a timewhenthe Administration was attempting to imposesanctionson the
regime.Bermanand Heineman' s coninent was that"Itis not easy to find ra-
tional justification for many ofthe quotas that were recoemendedbythe House
Agriculture Committee and included with little change in the final
39would have disassociated themselves from the foreign interests, yet that does
not appear to have happened.
Furthermore, there are a number of actions that were NOT taken that would
have been rational, if one accepts the viewpoint that the overall program was
beneficial to sugar interests.5a To cite just a few: If large Hawaiian growers
really profited from the program, one would have expected them to be suff i-
ciently rational to support a price ceiling in 1974, rather than to permit the
opposition that arose to the vory high (and very tenporary) price of sugar to
defeat the entire program; 2). why did the sugar interests accede to American
effortsto support the International Sugar Organization in the late l970s
rather than push for more effective action?; 3) why in the early 1960s did the
ugar interests so adamantly support country-specific quotas, when they could
have bargained for a larger donestic fraction of the market with a global
quota?
Then, too, there is a list of positive mistakes if one takes a narrow,
short-run,self—interest model and accepts that the sugar program did help
American sugar over the short run. There seems little doubt that manyofthe
largegrowers were among those most adamantly opposed to the program in 1934,
although they did reverse sides by l937. There is also the question of why
legislation."(P. 425). They proceeded to cite a quota of 15,000 tons for
Panama (which had produced only 5000 tons a year) and several other countries
which could not meet their quota, as well as quotas for the Netherlands and
Ireland (although a separate provision of the bill prohibited imports from
countries that themselves importedsugar as these latter two countries do).
58. Thereis abundant evidence worldwide that protection of domestic in-
dustries tendsto weaken their competitive abilities and thus render them even
higher cost and more uncompetitive in the long run than they are when protec-
tionis first introduced. It is certainly conceivable that that has happened
to American sugar. While it is unarguable that some sugar land has such good
alternatives that it is inherently uncompetitive at any plausible world price
of'sugar, itis also possible that some lands, such as the Hawaiian, might
havebeen considerably lower cost producers had they been subject to foreign
competition.
59. See, for example, I{rauss and Alexander, 1965, Pp.336.
40soft drinkbottlers, cake mixmanufacturers,bakers, and confectionerswere so
willing to support the program. Finally, the support of the sugar refiners was
clearlyessential for the continuation of the program and yet wasobviously
ruinous to them in the longrun.
Finally,in the large, there have clearly been a numberofactions which
could at best have been very short-term maximization. Given that the United
States will shortly stop importing sugar altogether, and that high fructose
corn syrup and crystalline fructose corn can be expected to continue to take
an increasing share of the market (along with non—caloric or low—caloric
sweetenerswhich are better able to compete at higher sugar prices) it is in-
teresting to asic whether the sugar program has even been in the long-run in-
terests of Hawaiian and other low—cost growers.
Moreover, there seems to have been no effort to bring HFCS under regula-
tionto prevent its emergence asa substitute for sugar. Certainly ifit was
rationalto seek a highdomestic sugar price, the sugar producersshould have
sought a ban on high fructose corn syrup, or if not that, at least a system of
deficiency payments rather than price-raising measures.The declining con-
sumption of sugar in the United States, and the increasingly competitive posi-
tionof corn substitutes were clearly not consistent with the longer-tern in-
terests of sugar producers, andevenless so of refiners. Had sugar growers
and refiners been willing to accept a deficiency paymentprogram in the late
l960s (so that payments to growers would compensate for any divergence between
the world price-plus-margins and the domestic support price), much of the HCFS
competitionwould have beenavoided.60
60.The representatives of the corn refiners were at painstoassureCongress
thattheir costs were high, and that "sugar is still the standard of the
sweetener industry." (Testimony of Donald E. Nurdlund, Chairman of A. E.
Staley ManufacturingCo.,representing the corn producers,at1978 HouseHear-
ings, p. 138
41At present, the corn producers strongly oppose any switch to deficiency
payments on the grounds that they would provide "unfair competition' to corn
inthe sweetener market. Indeed, Congressional representatives fron corn-
producing states now appear to be the strongest supporters of the sugar
program, including import quotas. Whether that support group would have
developedhad sugarproducers correctly estimated the potential competition
fromcorn is an open question. Certainly, to the extent that corn producers
are the gainers from the sugar program, there is no evidence of their apparent
support for the program prior to the l970s.
The apparent reason for the sugar growers' opposition to deficiency pay-
ments seems to have been their concern that a ceiling would be placed on the
size of the payment that might be made to any individual farm. This in itself
suggests that growers were sensitive to the degree to which benefits went to
largerfarners, but it does not indicate why refiners and processors were
willing to support import and production quotas.6'
Even beyond that, however, there lies the question --alluded to by Johnson
as to why in the early 1960s it was anticipated that there would be great
benefits to expanded beetsugar production. These do not seem to have been
forthcoming, and the evidence strongly suggests that such an exponsion was not
inthe interests of existing producers and did not significantly benefit those
in areas where new beetsugar mills were established.
61. For an amusing sidelight to the story, see the testimony of Helen
Rohrbaugh, Head,Quota Section, Special Operations Branch, Office of Opera-
tions,U.S. CustomsService. This branch is (or at least was in 1974) in
chargeof administering all import quotas. Ms. Rohrbach explained why her
branch could not administer import quotas (which were set in raw value terms)
as then currently laid down: Congressman Vigorito, who presided at the hear-
ings, thankedherfor her testimonywith the statement: "You have brought to
myattention a small group in Customs that I did not know existed (P. 97
of 1974 hearings)
42If one is to believe statements from representatives of the sugar inter-
ests, sugar producers have not been happy with the program. According to the
Economist after the 1985 bill was passed:
It might be supposed that the sugar-growers at eas, would be happy
with the absurd press for regulations. They are not. They get a government
subsidy of 17 cents a pound, but say it costs them 20 cents to produce one.
Acreage under sugar caneinFlorida, Louisiana andHawaii, orunder sugarbeet
in themidwest, continues to contract.... Economist, June 1, 1985, P. 31 of
Americansurvey.
There is then the curious episode with the International Sugar Associa-
tion: the ISA could not contain the price of sugar even within a very wide
band. In part this was because the EC did not join. However, it is difficult
to imagine that, even with EC participation, the target range could have been
maintained without resources considerably in excess of those available to the
ISA. It is difficult to believe that the ISA was expected tobe effective in
stabilizing the sugarprice: why, then, was support for ISA membership taken
asan acceptable substitute by the sugar producers for a sugar program?
Next,thereis an interesting question as to whysomearguments are con-
vincing, or are thought convincing, in thepolitical arena.Virtually all
witnesses to Congressional hearings on the sugar program listed as one of its
majorvirtuesthe fact that "it costs the taxpayer nothing".62
62. See, for example, the statement contained in the House Agriculture Com-
mittee pamphlet on the U.S. Sugar Program (1971): "The Sugar Acthas givenus
this security of supplies at a reasonable cost to the consumer and at no cost
tothe taxpayer. .. "P.45.Note, however, that the decision to permit the import
and reexport of 400,000 tons of sugarinthe omnibusspending billpassedby
Congressin December1987invalidates this argument, andofcourse sets a
precedentfor subsidies to support exports in future years.
43A second oft-repeated argument pertained to the alleged instability of the
international sugar market aridthe'need' for price stability for producers.
This argumentfirst appeared in Roosevelt's message to Congress in 1934, and
wasreiterated by almost all witnesses supporting the Sugar Program. Yet the
programwas neither designed for "stability" (since there was no ceiling) nor
were there efforts to set a "band" within which the price might fluctuate.
Whetheritwas thought that appeals for "stability" were more convincing than
appealsfor support prices is open to conjecture, but the inconsistecy of
rhetoric pertaining to stability with the appeals for higher prices strikes
one on even the most casual perusal of Congressional testimony.
Although a large number of other apparent irrationalities could be pointed
to, it suffices to mention one more: surely in 1974 and again in 1981, it
should have been understood that the prevailing price of sugar would not con-
tinue indefinitely. Even without any degree of sophisticated understanding of
the sugar market domestically and internationally, all testinony before both
houses of Congress hadforyears emphasized the wide fluctuations in sugar
prices as a reason for controls. Yet the Reagan administration apparently
bci ieved that it hadasugar program which would not require a return to the
country-specific quotas that hadearlierprevailed.
8.3.Goodness of Fit of Existing Political Economy Models
Without doubt, the saga of the American sugar oorigran over the 1934-1987
period contains elements ofa numberofthe models discussedinSect.1.There
is very little of the "benevolent guardian, social—welfare maximizing" govern-
mentin the story, however, and that model fails, at least after 1934.
Clearly lobbying was important, as the various components of the sugar
industry sought to increase the benefits they perceived as emanating from the
bill and foreign lobbyists did the same thing for their clients. Becker's
44model and the Brock-Magee approachboth havesignificant elementsof truth,at
leastinanalyzing the sugar program and its evolution. There are, however, a
number ofphenomenawhichare not captured in these models,towhich attention
returnsin Sects. 8.4 to 8.6.
An interesting point to note with respect to lobbying models, however, is
that they do not fit Olson's prediction that interest groups would form when
the group on the opposite side of the market consists of relativly small and
fragmentedentities. Sugar users were at least as large as sugar producers and
nonethelessjoined in the coalition. One would not have forecast the coalition
of interests that did emerge. There was ultimately a significant conflict be-
tween theinterestsof domestic and foreign growers, between domestic growers
and refiners, and between domestic producers and domesticindustrial users.
Theselatter were large, which isnot normally anticipated in discussions of
lobbying.63Thepuzzlehere is thrown in even sharper relief when it is asked
why sugar growers, millers, ref iners,and users were all on the same side of
the issue when there were clearly some divergent interests among them.
Lobbying, at least by domestic growers, was NOTsignificantin the in-
auguration of the sugar program, however. Growers seem actively to have op-
posed it initially, and it is certain they didnot lobby for it. In that
respect, the Bhagwati—Srinivasan revenue-seeking model, inwhich resources are
spent in an effort to obtain a program of value, does not seem appropriate for
the initiation of the sugar program. Once the programwas in place, however,
domestic sugar growers ralliedto itssupport. In a sense, the historyof the
63.There is no doubt that Americans ownedsomesources of foreign supply.
This wasespeciallytrue in the l930s. However, even then, only abouta third
of Cuban sugar Ias produced under American ownership. For the Philippines, the
fraction did not reach that level until after Philippine preferences were in
place, and the mechanism seems to have worked the other way around: the
American preference induced American firmstostart producing in the Philip-
pines. See U. S. Tariff Commission, 1937.
45sugar program since 1934 is that a government which regarded itself as a
platonicguardian put the program in place with certain short-tern goals. The
programonce in place was perpetuated by the interaction of political arid
market forces that could seize upon it.Thus, a programwhich started out in-
tended tobenefit Cuba wasnonethelessperpetuatedwhonassisting Cuba wasno
longer an object of policy. Likewise, country-specific quotas continuedafter
the American interest in Cuba subsided, in part because they were lobbied for
andsupportedby powerfulgroopsin Congress which had grown up because the
sugarprogram was there. Even in the l980s, when sugar interests came to
recognize their interest in deficiency payments rather than price supports,
corninterests emerged to defend the program.
Theconservativesocial welfare function argument reasonably well fits the
motive for introduction of the sugar program in 1934; it does not explain its
reintroduction in 1948, its continuation of country-specific quotas after
1960, nor the evolution of the program thereafter.
Thus, there is no doubt that econonic interests and lobbying go part way
toward explaining the sugar program. There are missing elements, however, to
which attention turns below. First, itisapparent that institutional
mechanisms were necessary in order to facilitatethe continuation of the
program,and that alternative arrangements might have reduced the economic
costs of the program, even if they would not have eliminated it. Secondly, it
is clear that markets reacted to the various shifts and turns in policy in
ways which neither politicians nor sugar interests anticipated. In this sense,
there never was "the" sugar program; rather, policies evolved over time as
politicians reacted to market responses (and exogenous events) and markets
reacted to the changes in policy. Finally, any reading of the evolution of
46sugar policiesover time suggests that a numberofkey issues surrounding
transparency,knowledge, and the role of technocrats must be addressed. It is
to these missing ingredients that attention now turns.
8.4 Institutional Issues
Several institutional issues are noteworthy. First, there is the anomaly
(for the American congress) that sugar legislation was handled by the Senate
Finance Committee (because it is an import) and the House Agriculture Com-
mittee (by historical accident). Moreover, because it was an import and thus
had revenue implications, only the House had the power to initiate legisla-
tion.This gave the House Agriculture Committee considerably more power over
sugar than it would have had had the counterpart body been the Senate Agricul-
ture Committee, and the House Agriculture Committee had considerably more
ability to focus its attention on sugar than would the House Ways and Means
omniittee 64
Second,the sugar program could not have persisted in anything like the
form that it did had sugar not been an import. At a minimum, there would have
been a budgetary cost to any program which raised price. As mentioned above,
the 'lack of budgetary cost" was frequently mentioned as an important point by
advocates of the program. Likewise, because sugar was an import, the program
provided instruments of foreign policy (the sugar quotas) which would other-
wise not have been present. Moreover, had sugar not been an import, it would
64. Had the House Ways and Means Committee handled the legislation,its atten-
tion would have been spread over enough other issues that it could not have
devoted as much tine to it as did the House Agriculture Committee. Moreover,
membership on the House Ways and Means Committee would have been determined
with respect to many more issues and thus could not have been as specialized
as was the House Agriculture Committee. For a discussion of these issues, see
Price.
47have been dealt with together with other agricultural commodities: it is
likely that the ability of sugar interests to influence the outcome (for bet-
ter or worse in their ownselfinterest) would have been less.65
Indeed, it is arguable thatitwas the ability of the sugar interests to
distancethemselves from other elements of a political situation that was cru-
cial to the continuation of the program: it was an import, mid therefore came
before the Sexate Finance Committee and was not dealt with as part of other
agricultural legislation. While an import, it was agricultural, and thus not
dealtwith in other trade legislation along with other importable commodities.
Third,it took the agreement of all producing interests -beetgrowers,
cane growers, beet refiners, cane millers, and cane refiners -toinsure the
continuation of tho program. Indeed, until the mid 1970s, what is remarkable
is that the Sugar Users Group did not oppose the program.
Fourth, the fact that the interrelationships wero complex undoubtedly in-
creased the political influence of those who did undcrstand the economics arid
politicsofthe sugar program: in a sense, the complexity of the issues stood
as a barrier to entry of nonspocialists.66
8.5. Interaction of Economic arid Political Markets
65. The above paragraph was written prior to the passage of the 1987 omnibus
spendingbill. That bill sets a precedent for expenditures on supporting sugar
prices that may ease the way for subsidy payments when sugar is no longer im-
ported. Even so, one might guess that pressures against sugar will mount when
the program must be financedfromthe budget.
66. In some hearings late in 1974 after the defeat of the Sugar Program, a
number of witnesses were called. The first was a Mr. Arthur Calcagnini, Direc-
torof the Sugar Division, USDA. He was carefully examined on his move from
AmeropCorp., international sugar dealers, to USDA which hadtaken placeear-
herin 1974. Other witnesses included: Mr. Thomas 0. Murphy, the USDA Sugar
Division Director from 1963 to 1972, who was in 1974 President, United States
Sugar Beet Association; and Mr. Lawrence Myers, who had been USDA Sugar
Divisioin Director from 1948 to 1963, and who was a "consultant in agricul—
tural economics and economic adviser to the Philippine Sugar Institute." (P.
81). See also Sect. 8.6 below
48Examination of the history of the sugar program strongly suggests that,
once created, a policy instrument will: 1) be seized upon by groups who per-
ceive themselves to benefit (regardless of whether they had anything to do
with initiating the program or not); 2) induce economic market reactions which
will minimize the costs of the program; 3) lead to political responses to (2)
by the groups formed under (1) to attempt to offset these economic market
reactions, which in turn will lead to 4) increasingly complex policy instru—
merits designed both to deal with the competing interest groups that form
around the policy instrument and simultaneously to subvert the sorts of market
responses perceivedto be detrimental.
This sequence, whichasarticulated, sounds very straightforward, is
perhapsthemost obvious, but also the most complex, of conclusions. For it
suggests that, once an instrument is inplace,avarietyof political forces
willemerge that will act upon it and try to seize it in ways that are largely
unpredictable. In the case of the U.S. Sugar Program, the instrument was ini-
tially opposed by the sugar producers, but they very quickly reversed their
position and supportedits continuation. Likewise, the sugar exporting
countries strongly supported the program until the mid-l980s, and then
reversedtheir position ii response to the market forces set in motion by the
price support program.
Ironically in 1948, it was a perceived obligation to Cuba, rather than any
motivationof domestic producers that led to the reinstatement of the program.
During the years 1948 to 1960, Congressmen dealing with the sugar program were
regarded virtually as foreign agents -theirinterests appeartohave been
primarilyin allocating import quotas rather than benefitting domestic inter-
ests.
49There are two interesting mental experiments that can be performed; 1)
what would have happened had the Cuban government not changed? and 2) what
would have happened if there had been no sugar program prior to 1960 when the
Cuban government changed? In answer to the first1 the most reasonable conjec-
ture would appear to be that the U.S. sugar program would have continued, muoh
as before, and that there never would have been the expansion of beet acreage
and other high—cost (and possibly even ill—advised on the part of those who
undsrtook them) and beet refining capacity that characterized the 1960s. It is
hard to imagine the impetus that would have been necessary to substantially
increase American acreage at the expense of imports.
With regard to the second question, had there been no sugar program in
1960, the most likely outcome probably is that the United States would have
continued buying sugar on world markets. It is difficult to imagine a sequence
of events under which a changed Cuban government could have been seized upon
as a rationale for the inauguration of a Sugar Program.
Insofar as these conjectures are plausible, they strongly suggest that it
is much easier to adapt, or seize, an already—existing instrument, than it is
tc have a mew one created. For that reason alone, an existing instrument is
very likely to become used for objectives and by groups that may not have been
theintended beneficiaries at all when the instrument was first formed.
There is then the question of market reaction. Clearly, the market will
minimize the cost of any given policy-imposed distortion. In the case of
sugar, this entailed two important reactions and several minor ones. The
first important reaction was the shift in the location of preduction (with
expansion of Florida land and reduction in beet land). The second was the
developmentof substitutes and with it, thepotential disappearance of sugar
asan importable good: that will make the Sugar Program, in its present form
(with a legislated mandate to avoid any payments by the U.S. government), in-
50feasible. Absenta legal banon developmentof all substitutes, itisdif-
ficultto see how the political process can further increase the real price of
sugar, especially as and if crystalline corn sugar becomes economic. In the
longer term, this market reaction to the sugar program may indeed threaten the
economic viability of' the entire sugar industry in the United States -thereby
doing the very thing that many supporters of the sugar program claimed they
were trying to avoid.
The minor reactions include the importation of soft drinks, cake mixes,and
other sugar-containing products from Canada and elsewhere, the need for
detailed regulation of imports to avoidstorage costs for American refiners,
theseizure of the program by sugar refiners as a basis on which to press for
a ban on imported raw sugar or of refined beet sugar, and the diplomatic and
other complications arising out of establishing and implementing import quotas
for a large number of countries. An interesting reaction, difficult to clas-
sify, has been the increased volatility of the international sugar price in
response to the smaller and smaller vohune of transactionsgoing through the
"freemarket" (which would more appropriately be termed the"residual" market).
These market reactions in turn have induced political responses: bans on
imports of cake mixes, and then of processed food products containing sugar;
movementfrom annualto quarterly import quotas; reactions to the high sugar
priceof theearly1970s (which itself was arguably the outcome of the earlier
decision to increase domestic production, which depressed the world price,
leading to amplified fluctuations in plantings and in sugar price cycles)
which ledtothe (temporary) abandonment of the program, and so on.
Ina sense, this "life of its own" hypothesis is the most disturbing for
potential econoinist—policymakers. If the hypothesisis correct, it says that
even if a program isdesignedtomeetsocially-desirable objectives in cost-
51minimizing ways, it will likely be seized upon by groups and in circumstances
only remotely related to the initial intent of the program. Once put in place,
a policy may evolve in ways unrelated to the initial purpose.67
8.6. Role of knowledge and technocrats
Partly because of the interaction of economic and political aarkets, any
ongoing program is likely to become very complex. While sugar may be espe-
cially so, it is at least arguable that other agricultural commodities, im-
ports subject to quota, health regulations, and most other policy instruments
inevitably become highly complex. One important consequence is that a coterie
of specialists is called for whose human capital consists of their understand-
ing of the program, arid hopefully of the economic implications of alternative
changes in policies.68
Complexity in and of itself provides a significant barrier to participa-
tion of nonspecialist groups in thedecision process.In the case of sugar
legislation,it seemsevident that there were a number of efforts to resist
changes that might have made the program more transparent: sugar producers op-
posed deficiencypayments (until itwas too late) probably because the size of
payment per farmwould have been apparent and they feared a ceiling; import
67. One needs only to point to the complexity of American income tax laws
(even after reform) and of the Multi Fibre Arrangement to convince oneself
that the phenomenon is not limited to the sugar case.
68. Oneindicationof the ways in which these interests grow is to exanine the
lengthof hearings and thenumber of witnesses who appeared before the House
Agriculture Committee each time the SugarActwasunder consideration. The
1934Hearings were 251 pages long, with 33 witnesses; in 1937 Hearings were
373 pages long, with 47 witnesses. In 1940, Hearings were 302 pages with 40
witnesses; the 1948 Hearings were short with 114 pages and 10 witnesses; l95i
hearings were 323 pages with 46 witnesses and submissions; 1955 Hearings were
768 pages with 136 withesses and submissions; 1962 Hearings were 552 pages
with 81 witnesses and submissions; 1965 Hearings were 365 pages with 74 wit-
nesses and subaissions; 1971 hearings were 789 pages with 132 witnesses and
submissions. Even this understates the increase, as coalitions of supporters
(suchas the Sugar Users Group and the Sugar Producers Group) formed.
52quotas were country-specific, rather than global, and there was opposition to
any change; import quotas, rather than tariffs were the chosen instrument for
protection raw sugar refiners supported the program and sought prohibition of
imports rather than seeking protection from foreign refiners; and corn
producers were adamant in wanting sugar prices supported rather than seeking
higher support prices and deficiency payments for corn growers directly.
In addition, however, the specialists in a given policy instrument become a
vested interest in the maintenance of SCtIE policy.69 Those with understanding
of the U.S. Sugar Program could seek employment as lobbyists for foreign
governments,oras representatives of domestic groups, as Congressional staff
assistants,or with the Department of Agriculture. For any nonspecialistto
enterthe policy dialogue in a meaningful waywould require a considerable in-
vestment.
Allofthese phenomena suggest that public discussion of policy options
might be significantly improved if means could be found to keep policies
transparent and simple. The opposition to deficiency payments and other
transparentprocedures was clearly based on the hypothesis that they would not
have withstood careful scrutiny. Whether means can be found in complex markets
of limiting the types of interventions that are permitted is a difficult sub-
ject, and one well beyond the scope of this essay. Nonetheless, it seems
highly likely that, had the Sugar Program been transparent and readily com-
prehensible to an informed citizenry, it could not have persisted in anything
like the form it did.
69. It might be argued that they would prefer some changes because that gener-
ates more work, but that issue is secondary. The hypothesis here is that the
loss of human capital that would be involved in the complete abandonment of a
program is probably so large as to induce specialists to advocate "more ra-
tional" programs, rather than program abandonment.
539. Some Tentative Conclusions
No casestudy can provide the generalizations desirable to form a basis for
a theory of political-economic interactions. The U.S.Sugar Programis,none-
theless, interesting inthat itraisessome questions that are not readily
handledwith the use of traditional models. Its evolution demonstrates that a
static analysis of the costs and benefits of the program at a point in time
would significantly misstate the program's impact: clearly account must be
takenof the ways in whicheconomic and political responses will alter the
programover time. It is to be hoped that future research will enable the
transformationof some of the questions raised here into testable hypotheses
Severalquostions clearly call for further research.Among them: 1) to
what extent are the economic outcomcs of policiesreasonably correctly an-
ticipated and to what extent to side effects render the outcomes unacceptable
to the policies' advocates?; 2) can one find meaningful characterizations of
the logic of interactionbetween political andeconomicmarkets?; and3)can
one classify policy instruments according to criteria (such as transparency)
and themmakemeaningfulpredictions as to, for example, the likely excess
costof policies pursued with each of these instruments?
At this stage, the conclusions that emerge arise primarily with regard to
the sugar program itself. First, when itwasoriginally formulated in 1934,
and thenwhen itwasreinstated in 1948, the intentions of its advocates bore
littleresemblance to the purposes to which it was put some twenty or thirty
years later. Second, it seems highly unlikely thattheelectorate would sup-
port a program that provides payments of ever $136,000 per farm were that
figurehighly publicized.Third, at least some of the supporters of the sugar
program ever theyears—theimporters andrefinersof raw sugar and the beet
mills owners whowentbankrupt at the very least -wouldnet have been so en-
thusiastichad they )mown the outcome.
54At a more general level, two tentative lessons emerge. First, at the very
least, economists advocating government intervention in markets would be well
advised to recognize that the measures they advocate will, once enacted, have
a life -includingsupporters -ofits own. Second, in choosing between alter-
native policy instruments, there should be a strong presumption in favor of
simple, transparent instruments: the likelihood that those instruments can be
seized in ways unacceptable to a comprehending electorate would be reduced.





1948 4.17 5.6 1.34
1949 4.34 5.8 1.34
1950 4.98 5.9 1.18
1951 5.67 6.1 1.08
1952 4.17 6.3 1.51
1953 3.41 6.3 1.85
1954 3.26 6.1 1.87
1955 3.24 6.0 1.85
1956 3.48 6.1 1.75
1957 5.16 6.1 1.18
1958 3.50 6.3 1.80
1959 2.97 6.2 2.09
1960 3.14 6.3 2.01
1961 2.91 6.4 2.20
1962 2.98 6.3 2.11
1963 8.50 8.2 0.96
1964 5.87 6.9 1.18
1965 2.12 6.8 3.21
1966 1.86 7.0 3.76
1967 1.99 7.3 3.67
1968 1.98 7.5 3.79
1969 3.37 7.8 2.31
1970 3.75 8.1 2.16
1971 4.52 8.5 1.88
1972 7.43 9.1 1.22
1973 9.61 10.3 1.07
1974 29.99 29.5 0.98
1975 20.49 22.5 1.10
1976 11.58 13.3 1.15
1977 8.11 11.0 1.36
1978 7.82 13.9 1.78
1979 9.66 15.6 1.61
1980 29.02 30.1 1.04
1981 16.93 19.7 1.16
1982 8.42 19.9 2.36
1983 8.49 22.0 2.59
1984 5.18 21.7 4.19
1985 4.04 20.3 5.02
1986 6.05 21.0 3.47
1987 7.10 21.7 3.06
column 1: Caribbean price; column 2: New York duty-paid price; column 3:
the ratio of 1 to 2
Source: U. S.Department of Agriculture, Sugar and Sweeteners Situaion,
various issues.
56Table 2. SUGAR AND SWEFID''ER (X)NSUMPTION,
UNITED STATES, 1970—1987
Ref mcd IIFCS Total Total Percent Sugar
sugar corn Sweetenersof Total
(millions of çp
1970 10.43 0.07 1.98 12.57 83.0
1971 10.60 0.09 2.16 12.91 82.1
1972 10.74 0.14 2.21 13.11 81.9
1973 10.68 0.22 2.48 13.31 80.2
1974 10.22 0.32 2.68 13.03 78.4
1975 9.63 0.54 2.97 12.75 75.5
1976 10.18 0.78 3.24 13.56 75.0
1977 10.37 1.05 3.44 13.96 74.4
1978 10.18 1.35 3.75 14.10 71.4
1979 10.05 1.67 4.09 14.30 70.2
1980 9.52 2.18 4.58 14.24 64.7
1981 9.13 2.67 5.12 14.39 63.4
1982 8.56 3.10 5.60 14.31 59.8
1983 8.33 3.60 6.12 14.61 57.0
1984 8.01 4.30 6.84 15.01 53.4
1985 7.58 5.39 7.96 15.70 48.2
1986 7.37 5.53 8.12 15.66 47.0
1987 7.44 5.65 8.29 15.89 46.8
Source:U. S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. and Sweeteners Situation,
June 1987
Note:Noncaloric sweeteners consumption (in sugar equivalent weight) was .59
million tons in 1970 and rose to 2.23 million tons by 1986.




(1,000 short tons, raw value)
1950 108 456 ——— 564 961 1,299 2,824
1951 122 297 ——— 419 996 1,128 2,653
1952 154 451 ——— 605 1,020 1,372 2,997
1953 151 481 ——— 632 1,099 1,182 2,913
1954 132 478 ——— 610 1,077 1,204 2,891
1955 119 455 ——— 574 1,140 1,166 2,880
1956 129 432 ——— 561 1,100 1,152 2,813
1957 136 398 ——— 534 1,085 990 2,609
1958 130 443 ——— 579 1,158 934 2,278
1959 175 441 ——— 616 975 1,087 2,678
1960 160 470 630 936 1,019 2,585
1961 208 650 858 1,092 1,110 3,060
1962 380 472 852 1,120 1,009 2,981
1963 424 759 1,183 1,101 989 3,273
1964 574 573 1,147 1,179 989 3,315
1965 554 550 1,104 1,218 897 3,219
1966 652 562 1,214 1,234 883 3,331
1967 717 740 1,457 1,191 818 3,446
1968 546 669 1,215 1,232 645 3,092
1969 535 537 1,072 1,182 483 2,737
1970 652 602 ———1,254 1,162 460 2,876
1971 635 571 ———1,206 1,230 324 2,760
1972 961 660 ———1,621 1,119 298 3,038
1973 824 558 381,420 1,129 255 2,804
1974 803 594 741,471 1,041 291 2,803
1975 1,061 640 1261,827 1,107 303 3,237
1976 930 650 941,674 1,050 312 3,036
1977 894 668 881,650 1,034 267 2,951
1978 972 550 611,583 1,029 204 2,816
1979 1,047 500 931,640 1,060 193 2,893
1980 1,121 491 931,705 1,023 177 2,905
1981 963 712 1101,785 1,048 153 2,986
1982 1,307 675 98 2,080 983 113 3,176
1983 1,223 603 60 1,886 1,044 100 2,799
1984 1,412 452 81 1,945 1,062 97 3,002
1985 1,413 532 762,021 2,021 109 3,109
1986 1,382 650 752,107 1,045 95 3,426
Source: U.S.D.A. andSweetener Situation, ODtober 1986.
means no production at that time.
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